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RECENT CASES
CRIM INAL LAW -

INCONSISTENT VERDICT--

DOUBLE JEOPARDY'
In a recent Florida case, defendants were charged on two counts in
the same indictment with (I) breaking and entering with intent to

commit larceny, and (2) larceny. They were acquitted of the former
and convicted of the latter. On appeal, they contended that the verdict
was inconsistent and should be set aside. The Supreme Court held
that the offense of burglary does not necessarily include that of larceny
and that the verdict was iot inconsistent.
Cases relied on by appellants establish that in one type of case,
inconsistency of verdict is groid for reversal.' In this type, if the
jury finds a defendant guilty on two counts both of which he cannot in
law be guilty of because guilt of one necessarily proves innocence of the
other, the verdict mtrst he set aside. Thus, where one has been convicted
of larceny, he cannot be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving the
thing stolen.' The statutory crime of receiving stolen goods is a separate
offense,' not intended to punish the thief by way of double penalty.
Rather, it is aimed at those who encourage theft by making it easy or

profitable.'
Another- type of inconsistency is not ground for setting the verdict
aside. This occurs, where a defendant is,acquitted on one offense and
convicted on another closely related to it, proof of both offenses depend-

ing upon proof of the same facts. For example, when the defendant is
acquitted of the charge of possession of intoxicating liquor, but convicted
of maintaining a nuisance, the courts have maintained that consistency
in the verdict is not necessary, if the resulting error has caused no
substantial injury.' It is permissible for a jury to convict on one count
* Goodwin et al. v. State, 26 So. (2d) 898 (1946).
Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12 (1928); Gordon et al. v.
State, 97 Fla. 806, 122 So. 218 (1929).
See note 1, supra; Commonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 60 (1880);
Tobin v. People, 104 I1. 565 (1882); Rosenthal v. U. S., 276 F. 714
(1921).

1 2 Bishop's New Criminal Law, para. 1140; Wharton's Criminal Law,
10th ed. para. 986; Regent v. Perkins, 5 Cox C. C. (Eng.) 554; In re
Franklin, 72 Mich. 615, 43 N. W. 997 (1889); Owen v. State, 52 Ind.
379 (1876).
Adams v. State, 60 Fla. 1,53 So. 451 (1910); Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1209.

* Selvester v. U. S., 170 U. S. 262 (1898); Dunn v. U. S., 284 U. S. 390
(1931); Borum v. U. S., 284 U. S. 596 (1932); Carrignan v. U. S., 290
F. 189 (1923); Marshallo v. U. S., 298 F. 74 (1924); Steckler v. U. S.,
7 F. (2d) 59 (1925); Gozner v. U. S., 9 F. (2) 603 (1925): Carroll
v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 951 (1927).
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and acquit on another when they' could have convicted for both oil the
same evidence.'
The court ii the principal case held that the verdict was not inconsistent, relying on a prior Florida decision which dealt with double
jeopardy.'. Double jeopardy occurs wheni a person, after acquittal or
conviction of a crime, is subsequently charged with the same or any
other crime, which includes or is included in the one of which he was
acquitted or convicted. A Florida peculiarity in this respect has been
since corrected. Formerly, Florida held that a conviction or acquittal
in order to be a bar to another prosecution had to he for the same
offense or for an offense of a higher degree and necessarily including
the of fense for which the accused stood indicted.' This position has been
abandoned and Florida now generally holds that if a minor offense is
embraced within a higher crime as a constituent element or component
part of it, and, on the trial of the higher offense, there could be a
conviction of the minor offense, then a conviction of the minor offense
Will bar a I)rosecution for the higher crime.'
The inconsistent verdict problem is concerned with a single proceeding.
whereas that of double jeopardy deals with consecutive proceedings."
Verdicts on different counts, however, are not to be set aside as inconsistent unless the finding on one necssarily includes finding that the essential
element in the other does not exist.'1 If the two crimes are distinct, on
the other hand, although growing from the same transaction, neither a
plea of inconsistency nor of double jeopardy will avail.
It has been held in another jurisdiction that a former acquittal of
larceny does not bar a subsequent indictment for procuring the same
goods by false pretenses." This is in effect, the application of the
1argesser and Gordon cases to the cognate principle of double jeopardy.
On the other hand, a person convicted of larceny might not thereafter
be tried for robbery, if the larceny in the former charge was an essential
element.'
By deciding in the principal case that the verdict was not
inconsistent, the court properly eliminated the question whether inconsistency demands that a verdict be set aside. This fact notwithstanding.
the court proceeded to rule that refusal- to set aside an inconsistent

' Mr. Justice Manton of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
in Carrol v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 951 (1927), stated: "Juries have never been
held to rules of Logics" see Steekler v. U. S., 7 F. (2d) 59 (1925);
Marshallo v. U. S., 298 F. 74 (1924); Gozner v: U. S., 9 F. (2d) 603
(1925).
' Brown v. State, 135 Fla. 90, 184 So. 777 (1938).
' Boswell v. State, 20 Fla. 869 (1884).
0 Sanford v. State, 75 Fla. 393, 78 So. 340 (1918).
- Morgan v. Devine, 35 S. Ct. 712 (1914).
"1 Commonwealth
v. Kline, 164 Atl. 124, 128 (1933); 107 Pa. Super.
594; see State v, Akers, 278 Mo. 368, 213 S. W. 424 (1919).

" Dominick v. State, 40 Ala. 680, 91 Am. Dec. 496 (1867).
" State v. Lewis. 9 N. C. 98. 11 Am. Dec. 741 (1822).
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verdict is not reversible error. It relied in part ol a statute which
prohibits reversal in the absence of error injuriously affecting appellant's
substantial rights," and in part on the Dunn case." Th Durn case,
however, was one where the defendant was acquitted of possessing
intoxicating liquor but convicted of maintaining a nuisanice by maintainling a place for the sale of intoxicating liquor. If defendant were to
stand convicted of larceny adm receiving the identical property as stolen
goods, as in the Bargesser and Gordon cases," it isbelieved that the
court would not hesitate to disregard as obiter the view expressed il
the principal case, and reverse.
REAL PROPERTY -

DOWER - EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
AND EXECUTION*
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Florida has laid clown the
unequivocal doctrine that a judgment and execution sale of a married
debtor's real estate not only divests him of all title thereto but also
completely extinguishes the wife's right of dower in the property.' This
represents a fundamcntal change in the attitude of the Florida court
toward this question and is completely contrary to the great weight of
authority in other jurisdictions.
As stated inl a standard authority, the majority rule-and erstwhile
Florida rule-i-s: "A sale of lands tinder execution against the husband
issued under a judgment rendered against him after the marriage will
not cut off the wife's dower 0 0 0 The law is settled in accordance
with the above 0 0 0 in those states where the common law rule prevails
and if the husband by his own conveyance cannot divest the wife's
dower, this cannot he done by a sale in execution under judgient
against him."'
There is no doubt that this rule represents the great weight of authority. The rule is so well settled that in recent yrears the courts have very
seldom beer called upon to determine the question; it is so well settled
that it is thus stated without qualification even ihi
encyclopedias of law.'
State after state has laid down this rule in the most unequivocal
language.'
- Criminal Procedure Act, See. 924.33, 1941 Statutes of Fla.
Note 6, supra.
"
Note 2, supra.
* In re Hester's Estate, 28 So (2d) 164, (Fla. 1946).
In re Hester's Estate, supra.
Annotation, 18 LRA 75, 78. Annot. cites Ind., Mo., Mass., N. J.,
Miss., Del., Minn.
* "Itis clear that at the common law sale under a judgment rendered
subsequent to marriage will not bar the widow of her dower." 21
Am. Jur. 153.
1 "It hardly seems necessary to cite authorities to the proposition
that at common law the wife could not be deprived of dower rights in
the real estate of her husband through sale upon execution under a
judgment obtained against him subsequently to marriage. * * * It has
"0

